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The General frowned as he read the Newsweek article, wondering why the Congress seemed so determined to expand
the role of the military into operations other than war, beyond the pale of established ways of defending the nation
against foreign threats. Now both Senate and House leaders wanted greater military involvement in the drug war.
Finishing his reading, he half-muttered, "If we must have distractions like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia, then
they shouldn't expect us to do more counterdrug support. The budgets are too tight. Don't they know how we've
downsized? Don't they realize the military isn't designed for law enforcement or social engineering? The nation
already has a DEA and the Salvation Army. Let us be soldiers, not cops or welfare workers." Buried deep in his
psyche was the idea, "We exist to `kill people and break things' when fighting our nation's wars. That's what soldiering
is all about." [1]
Perhaps this fictitious general has a point. Why should the military be involved in the drug war at all? In a period of
diminished resources, defense leaders are drawn to primary interests: preparing the force for warfighting contingencies,
such as responding to an attack on Middle East oil supplies, or intervening in a new conflict in Korea. Military leaders
have been contending with distracting commitments since shortly after the end of the Cold War.[2] Continual support
for operations other than war carries the potential for diminishing our momentum for shaping and sustaining the
warfighting force.
Those critical of military involvement in counterdrug activities muster a number of now-familiar arguments. They
point out that the military services have been supporting the nation's campaign against drug trafficking and drug abuse
since the early 1980s. They argue that large expenditures of money and manpower have produced little measurable
success in reducing the amount of drugs on the street. With all the current and projected demands on our smaller
military forces, they question whether we should continue to set aside scarce resources to support foreign and domestic
drug law enforcement agencies. Some critics also contend that fighting drug trafficking is not a proper military role,
that it may infringe on human rights, and that it could induce corruption in the ranks. Other serious observations are
that it is inherently a "no-win" mission that can reduce public confidence in the military, and that it is a mission that
could become a bottomless pit for men and resources.[3]
Another viewpoint, however, may be more compelling. Based not only on comparative threat assessments but also on
the social and political realities of the decade, this viewpoint contends that the legitimate use of military forces as an
element of national power need not be confined to conventional military-on-military conflict. Rather, the use of
military force should be considered whenever the nation is severely threatened by any circumstance to which no
adequate response is possible solely with civilian forces or resources. Moreover, for many units and unit personnel,
wartime mission requirements are virtually identical to those of counterdrug missions. Readiness for wartime can often
be increased by participation in real-world counterdrug operations. To advocates of this viewpoint, the answer to
questions about whether the military should become more or less involved in counterdrug activities lies in a deeper
question of what is best for the nation.
Those who argue for greater military involvement point out that three American Presidents have declared the drug
trade a threat to US national security. President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive to that effect,
and President Bush reaffirmed it in 1989, when the US Congress concurred and financed the Administration's "War on
Drugs." President Clinton restated this theme in Presidential Decision Directives, gave Cabinet rank to the Director of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and made him a member of the National Security Council.
The Congress has repeatedly stated its concern about the widespread effects of the drug problem and has backed the
past three administrations with legislative and financial support. The examples of Mexico, Colombia, and Peru--and
other foreign nations afflicted by the growing political and economic influence of drug traffickers--affirm the dangers
in allowing the problem to grow. Democracy is undermined, bribery and corruption abound, justice is thwarted,
criminal violence is rampant, and public confidence in elected and appointed officials is weakened. Similar trends are
appearing in varying degrees in the United States.
This article explores a number of propositions related to the roles of US military forces in the war on drugs. They
include an assessment of our current level of involvement in counterdrug support as a function of what we believe to
be the threat, leading to the question of whether we need more or less military support to the counterdrug strategy. The
article concludes that we should increase the tempo of military counterdrug support and reconsider our force design for
supporting the counterdrug strategy.
Magnitude of the Drug Threat
A strong argument can be made that the United States is facing a threat as dangerous to its national well-being and
moral fiber as anything encountered in the past 200 years. During 1995, some 20 million Americans, about one in nine
of our citizens, used some form of illicit drug; 12.8 million of those can be termed regular drug users.[4] Between
1992 and 1995, the rate of increase in drug use by teenagers more than doubled;[5] early reports for 1996 show the
trend is still increasing. There are well-established links among drug use and crime and violence. In a 1994 survey
under the Drug Use Forecasting Program, 66 percent of adult arrestees tested positive for use of at least one drug at the
time of arrest.[6] The demand for drugs has created a climate of fear in many neighborhoods; drug-related violence
and crime are not only prevalent in large cities, but have spread to small towns and rural areas as well. Citizens are
demanding greater protection--yet combating drug-related crime is already overtaxing both our criminal justice system
and our jails.
Our health care system is in danger of being overburdened. Those who use drugs by sharing contaminated needles
spread the AIDS virus and other diseases. Those who seek medical and psychological rehabilitation to free themselves
from drug addiction are draining assets that could be used to treat people with disorders unrelated to drugs.
We cannot deny that the situation is serious and expensive; conservative estimates from the Office of National Drug
Control Policy indicate that each year:
Americans spend about $49 billion buying illegal drugs.
Federal, state, and local governments collectively spend $30 billion in supply and demand reduction efforts and
in dealing with related problems.
The social cost of drug-related crime is $67 billion.
There are 25,000 drug-related deaths of US citizens and hundreds of thousands of babies exposed to illicit drugs
in utero.[7]
There are other indirect costs as well. Business and industrial leaders are aware that drug abuse is reducing their profits
through lost efficiency and diminished productivity, accidents, medical expense, absenteeism, and theft by employees
to support their habits. Studies have shown that drug users are three-and-a-half times more likely to be involved in a
plant accident than non-users; they are five times more likely to file a worker's compensation claim; they receive three
times the average level of sick benefits; and they function at roughly 67 percent of their work potential.[8] This type of
employee behavior results in enormous indirect losses to the economy each year.
No nation, even one as strong as the United States, can long afford to lose over $146 billion annually from its
economy. Neither can it indefinitely absorb the level of damage to its social institutions that is now being inflicted by
the trafficking and use of illegal drugs.
Though we can calculate the economic costs, we can never quantify the toll in human misery that drug abuse and drug
trafficking have wrought. Though most know drugs can be deadly, few realize that over 200,000 Americans have died

from the effects of illicit drugs in the past decade. In comparison, about 34,000 Americans were killed in action during
the Korean War and 47,000 killed in action during the more than ten years we fought in Vietnam.[9] These
comparisons put in perspective the magnitude of America's drug problem; they should bolster the nation and its
military in their commitment to the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy.
The National Drug Control Strategy
To counter the drug threat, in 1988 Congress directed that a National Drug Control Strategy be produced by the
President and that annual updates be submitted for congressional review. Each issue of the strategy, prepared by the
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, represents the judgment, priorities, and commitments of the
President regarding illicit drug control. Current priorities are treatment, prevention, domestic law enforcement, and
interdiction and international initiatives.[10]
In meeting these drug policy priorities, the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy identifies five goals:
Increase the safety of America's citizens by reducing drug crime and violence.
Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.
Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.
These goals require efforts to reduce both supply and demand, and the US military can contribute by deed and
example to their attainment. A total of $16 billion was requested by the Clinton Administration for drug control efforts
during FY 1998. Of this amount, $5.5 billion is targeted toward meeting demand-reduction goals; $8.4 billion for
domestic law enforcement; $1.6 billion toward interdiction goals; and $488 million for international goals.[11]
Department of Defense Counterdrug Missions
Every Secretary of Defense from Caspar Weinberger to William Perry has viewed the drug problem as a threat to
national security and has committed the US military to supporting counterdrug efforts by law enforcement agencies to
the extent permissible under law. Secretary William Cohen will likely do the same. In 1989, former Secretary Dick
Cheney directed the department to support the drug war because drugs pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and
security of the country. His letter to the combatant commanders made it clear that DOD counterdrug support was a
high-priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.[12] More recently, former Secretary Perry
expressed his support for an aggressive and results-oriented DOD counterdrug program. Under the supervision of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (who carries the additional duty of
DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support), the Defense Department has established five
counterdrug mission areas. These are:
Provide counterdrug training, operational, and materiel support to drug-source and drug-transit nations.
Support the domestic efforts of the US drug law enforcement community.
Give special support to the international cocaine strategy of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
Detect and monitor the air and sea illicit drug transportation networks.
Assist with the demand-reduction strategy in local communities and within DOD.[13]
The DOD counterdrug budget for fiscal year 1997 is $808 million, most of which will be spent on US domestic
programs to detect and interdict the flow of illicit drugs intended for US consumers. DOD personnel provide training,
administrative support, and logistical support to US drug law enforcement agencies in all 50 states and especially along
our borders with Mexico and Canada. They are involved in detecting and monitoring sea and air transportation through
the Caribbean, the Atlantic, and the Pacific; and they assist in operating counterdrug command and control networks.
International support activities in countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, the Bahamas, and others account
for one fifth of the $808 million. Nearly 90 percent of this international support funding is spent on operations and
maintenance (aircraft, radar, riverine operations). The rest is spent on research and the acquisition of materiel.[14]
The Supporting Military

The DOD missions are supported by the joint commands, their service components, and the reserve components. The
military is playing an important role, though a modest and carefully delineated one, both overseas and at home.
Overseas, the regional US commanders-in-chief are the principal conduits for providing military support to DEA and
other US agencies supporting US ambassadors and host-nation counterdrug forces. They support detection, monitoring,
and interdiction efforts and provide resources, as available, in those countries where drug production or trafficking is
affecting the United States.
On the domestic scene, active and reserve component forces, particularly the National Guard, support a wide range of
drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs), including local police and sheriff departments, state bureaus of investigation,
and federal agencies such as the US Customs Service, Bureau of Land Management, the DEA, the FBI, and the US
Border Patrol. They also support interagency coordination centers like Operation Alliance in El Paso, Texas, and
Project North Star in Buffalo, New York; these and similar centers have the mission of helping to guide the application
of military resources that support the DLEAs. For example, US Atlantic Command, through its Army component,
Forces Command, directs the actions of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) at Ft. Bliss, Texas.[15] JTF-6 coordinates the
employment of US federal military support to the supply-reduction efforts of domestic drug law enforcement agencies.
When service personnel and units are allotted to JTF-6 for DLEA support, they operate under the tactical control of
the task force commander.
National Guard forces employed on the domestic scene, unless federalized, operate under state command and control.
The various state counterdrug programs are coordinated by the National Guard Bureau, supported and supervised by
the DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support.
JTF-6
JTF-6 has support responsibilities for the entire United States, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. (When US
Southern Command assumes responsibility for the Caribbean, it will also take responsibility from JTF-6 for drug
support missions in that region.) Currently, priority of effort goes to the high-intensity drug trafficking areas
(HIDTAs), so designated in the National Drug Control Strategy because they are found to be centers of illegal drug
production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution that have significant effects on the nation.[16]
JTF-6 neither initiates operations in the law enforcement domain nor supports law enforcement activities unrelated to
drug control. For counterdrug support, it responds to requests that have been validated as having a drug connection and
have been assigned a priority by civilian law enforcement leaders. JTF-6 terrain analysis and threat information is
developed for military units only. DLEAs receive intelligence data through their own law enforcement channels or
from elements such as the National Drug Intelligence Center and the El Paso Intelligence Center.
JTF-6 classifies the military support it provides to domestic law enforcement agencies in five categories: operational,
general support, rapid support, intelligence, and engineer. It conducted 530 of these law enforcement support missions
in FY 1996.[17] Military support for JTF-6 missions enhances individual and unit readiness with real-world training
opportunities. JTF-6 provides a wide variety of military support activities, but budgeting and other constraints limit the
depth of that support.
Operational support involves military units conducting mission-related training such as ground reconnaissance and
sensor employment, aviation reconnaissance and support, and transportation. Ground reconnaissance, for example,
consists of two types of missions. One involves covering large terrain areas to find marijuana growing sites or to
identify smuggling routes and clandestine airfields. In the other type of mission, forces occupy listening posts or
observation posts on likely smuggling routes. The size of the force assigned these missions can be as small as a squad
or as large as several hundred soldiers or Marines. They typically avoid civilian contact and rely on night vision
devices and daylight long-range vision means to gather information.[18] Of 131 operational support missions
conducted during FY 1996, 47 percent were ground reconnaissance, 23 percent were aviation reconnaissance and
support, 12 percent were controlled delivery of sensitive drug material, nine percent were medical evacuation, five
percent were ground sensor employment, and three percent were transportation.
General support is the augmentation of law enforcement agencies with military-specific skills, training, transportation,

canine support, communications, technology, and communications. Of 124 general support missions during FY 1996,
nearly all (96 percent) were mobile training teams.
Rapid support is the immediate response to actionable intelligence. The Rapid Support Unit (RSU) is composed of an
Army Special Forces B Team (company headquarters) employing several Special Forces A Teams. About threequarters of RSU missions are ground reconnaissance; the rest are mobile training team missions.
Intelligence support consists of providing specialists who can assist DLEAs with training and analysis processes.
Typical missions include photo imagery interpretation, translator and linguistic support, and analyst support.
Intelligence support also includes using trained military intelligence analysts, translators, and linguists to provide
DLEAs with enhanced case analysis and language capabilities. During FY 1996, 349 intelligence analysts and
translators were provided to DLEAs for missions like drug trafficking organization analysis, link and pattern analysis,
intelligence database construction and management, situation briefs, and linguistic support.[19]
Engineer support involves road repair and various construction projects. Typical missions include constructing border
fences, lighting, and law enforcement training facilities. At Tucson, Nogales, and Douglas, Arizona, 87 miles of roads
have been upgraded to assist the US Border Patrol; at San Ysidro, California, engineer-built fencing and roads were
constructed to help control the drug traffickers' access to US territory. An engineering assessment of the tunnel built
under the border at Otay Mesa to carry drugs from Mexico into California has helped the DLEAs understand ways to
combat this unique drug threat.[20] Twenty-four engineer support missions were conducted during FY 1996.
The Information Analysis Center
In addition to JTF-6, US Atlantic Command provides an Information Analysis Center (IAC) to assist the US
Ambassador to Mexico and his country team. The IAC falls under the staff supervision of the Army Forces
Command's Director of Operations, and it takes its interagency lead for in-country actions from the country team's
DEA attaché. The IAC currently has five communications and information analysts, and it will probably add logistical
and operations planners to complete its organization at about nine people.
The Information Analysis Center provides a communications link to support country team cooperative programs with
Mexican authorities and US DLEAs in Mexico. The IAC develops information products (such as terrain and movement
analysis), assists with operational planning, analyzes multiagency counterdrug information, and provides tracking and
technical data to Mexican and US DLEAs.[21]
The IAC sustains a round-the-clock communications and analysis center that coordinates overflight and air safety
information for US aircraft. It assists the hand-off of counterdrug actions from US assets to Mexican authorities in
order to deal with drug criminals within the sovereign territory of Mexico. In this regard, the IAC coordinates support
to the Mexican Northern Border Response Force, a Mexican counterdrug law enforcement team that intercepts drug
criminals. As the focal point for DOD detection and monitoring requirements for Mexico, the IAC is an important
asset for coordinating with JTF-6 on operations that are close to Mexico's northern border. The IAC's communication
and coordination functions ensure that counterdrug law enforcement efforts on the US-Mexico border are conducted
safely at the tactical level.
The Joint Interagency Task Forces
Several other joint task forces specialize in counterdrug actions. Under the 1994 National Interdiction Command and
Control Plan these units were designated as Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs). The JIATFs operate under the
oversight of the US Interdiction Coordinator--currently the Commandant of the Coast Guard. US Atlantic Command
has JIATF-East in Key West, Florida; US Pacific Command has JIATF-West at March AFB, California; and US
Southern Command has JIATF-South, located in Howard AFB, Panama. In addition, the US Customs Domestic Air
Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) at Riverside, California, was included in the National Interdiction Plan.
Each JIATF, and the DAICC, has an organic intelligence-gathering capability, a detection and monitoring mission, and
assigned DOD and drug law enforcement personnel.
Operation Laser Strike, a counterdrug operation conducted at the request of the US Interdiction Coordinator, provides

an example of the effectiveness of JIATF teams in integrating combined and interagency actions. This operation
evolved from the Support Justice (later Steady State) series of programs in the Andean countries in 1991 through 1994.
As a part of this early program series, Operation Ghost Zone in the Chapare region of Bolivia showed that combined
riverine, ground, and especially air interdiction operations can be effective in stopping the flow of coca product to
refiners in Colombia. It was a well-designed combined and interagency plan conceived with the help of planning
assistance from US Southern Command.[22] A follow-on operation called Green Clover concentrated detection and
monitoring assets in source countries to support interdiction.
Most successful to date has been the interdiction of airborne drug routes, especially in Peru. This can involve initial
detection, airborne monitoring, tracking the target, and then host-nation pursuit using reaction forces. Flights of E3C
Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft extend the coverage by US radars that have been
located in several South American countries. The AWACS affords a real-time link to host-nation air forces from
intercepting drug trafficking aircraft.[23] In 1995 Peru's air force destroyed nine drug trafficking aircraft and seized
and forced down two; Colombia destroyed three and forced down or seized 12.[24]
The effect of these kinds of operations against the "air bridge" to Colombia is that coca leaf and base prices paid to
coca farmers have dropped. "As a result, an increased number of farmers expressed interest in US AID alternative
development programs in the region."[25] Operation Laser Strike, begun in April 1996, continues with increased
intelligence support to US country teams and host-nation DLEAs. Meanwhile, however, drug traffickers are finding
new routes through Brazil and Bolivia, and the level of cocaine supply to the United States remains steady at some
300-plus metric tons a year.
The US Customs' Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) was reorganized under guidelines that
restructured the nationwide radar surveillance system to improve coordination of the detection, interception, and
apprehension of aircraft that illegally cross into US airspace carrying drugs and other contraband. The DAICC
monitors 150 miles seaward around Puerto Rico and 100 miles seaward around US coastlines; a subordinate operations
center in Puerto Rico extends radar coverage into the Caribbean.
In consideration of the Posse Comitatus law, the DAICC provides the law enforcement interdiction and apprehension
functions to counter air drug trafficking criminals who enter US territory. The DAICC also provides radar detection
and monitoring for the southwest border of the United States. Some emphasis is placed on the northern region of
Mexico near the border where air and ground activity indicate a high probability of drug smuggling activity inbound to
the United States.
JTF-6, the JIATFs, and the DAICC have proven themselves as valuable interagency coordinating centers for various
aspects of the supply reduction strategy. Although we continue to be bombarded by some 300 metric tons of smuggled
cocaine product yearly, the actions of these organizations conceivably stop another 300 metric tons from becoming
available in the United States.
The National Guard
The National Guard was an early advocate of military support to counterdrug activities and is an eager and valuable
participant. Today the Guard's domestic interdiction program is the largest in DOD. Many states, including Arizona,
California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas, have long been involved in
supporting drug law enforcement and have developed considerable expertise in combating the drug trafficker. Virtually
all states now have significant counterdrug programs to reduce both demand and supply. On a typical day, the National
Guard is engaged in about 1300 ongoing counterdrug missions and has about 4000 personnel on duty to perform
them.[26] Guard members on active duty can be found at virtually every major DLEA headquarters.
Unfortunately the National Guard budget was reduced from $230 million in 1993 to $158 million in 1996. As one
consequence there has been a reduction of Guard-assisted drug interdiction results over the same period: cocaine
seizures are down from 78 to 68 metric tons; heroin seizures down from 1508 to 741 kilos; marijuana plants eradicated
down from 206 million to 105 million; confiscation of processed marijuana down from 404 metric tons to 373 metric
tons.[27] Despite reduced resources, however, there continue to be success stories. In early 1997, at the Port of
Philadelphia, a National Guard intelligence analyst supporting the US Customs Service profiled a cargo ship he

thought was suspicious. As a result of his work, Customs officials found 15 barrels containing liquids in which almost
one ton of cocaine was suspended in solution. Later, in March 1997, Alabama National Guard members using C-26
aircraft with DEA personnel on board tracked a suspect vehicle overland to its destination near New Orleans. Then, by
directing DEA agents on ground to the proper site, 500 pounds of cocaine was confiscated.
The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) was established by the California National Guard in 1990. It is
especially important to the counterdrug effort for its unique courses that help leaders respond to the demand reduction
and supply reduction objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy through interagency teamwork. It offers a
counterdrug managers' course, which trains students on the process of planning and conducting effective interagency
counterdrug operations in both supply and demand reduction. Students are typically law enforcement, military, and
community leaders and planners. Another course, in drug prevention and demand reduction, trains students to develop
effective programs in those areas and to integrate the skills and resources found at the federal, state, and local levels.
This course focuses on exercises, case studies, and the planning process.
Considering the Options
What other approaches might we examine? Should DOD cut back its support, continue apace, or even offer increased
assistance? Are there any new concepts that could be considered?
It is indisputable that drug abuse and drug trafficking are doing considerable damage to our people and our social
institutions, and that the current level of effort is failing to curtail drug trafficking. Furthermore, no credible foreign
threat exists or is foreseen that exceeds the magnitude of the drug threat in terms of damage to the social, economic,
and moral fabric of American society. Given the dimensions of the drug threat, it seems unlikely that DOD or the
services would seek to eliminate or drastically reduce their counterdrug programs. More difficult is deciding whether
to maintain the status quo with regard to military counterdrug activity or to develop a more active posture with new
concepts for support.
Continuing current programs with expenditures of about $800 million a year allows for a range of necessary programs,
but it is not sufficient to do much in depth. Law enforcement officials at the tactical and operational levels are quick to
provide off-the-record evaluations of military counterdrug support: any help they receive is appreciated and valuable,
but it can be slow to arrive, is often not available to all who request it, and is generally insufficient to make any lasting
change in local drug situations. Our overseas counterdrug support is important and contributory, but thin. For example,
the counterdrug strategy is designed to attack drugs at their source, yet only three percent of the National Drug Control
Strategy budget, and 20 percent of DOD funding, goes to overseas efforts. In times of austere budgeting, only small
increases to the counterdrug budget can be expected, but there are other initiatives that could be considered.
Rethinking the Counterdrug Force
Without significant reductions in either the demand for drugs or their supply, the drug problem will continue to plague
the United States. Some shift in emphasis or increase in effort seems appropriate, but can the military establishment
step up to the challenge? A reassessment of our current support concepts and organizational design suggests that an
increase in the tempo of counterdrug operations by both the active and reserve components is warranted. Here are
some concepts for consideration.

. Enhance the policy and resource integration clout of the DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and
Support. This position deserves assistant secretary status in its own right to increase its authority and signal DOD's
interest and support for the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

. Establish a Counterdrug Joint Task Force (CDJTF). Just as we specially organized our counterterrorism effort, we
could also form a CDJTF to act as the executive agent for drug enforcement policy and support, primarily to improve
unity of effort. As a functional subunified command (perhaps under US Atlantic Command), the CDJTF would be
responsible for translating DOD counterdrug policy into counterdrug support. The drug scourge has proven to be a
more immediate threat than terrorism; the counterdrug effort deserves a place in the front rank of military priorities.

A standing CDJTF could maintain the skills and experience to deal with some 50-plus National Drug Control Program
agencies, private organizations, the states and territories, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and the
unified commands. It would have operational and drug law enforcement support responsibilities for the United States
and its territories. For matters within host nations, the CDJTF would take on a support and coordination role, helping
the regional commanders-in-chief while coordinating with key US government bureaus and agencies. It would also
integrate the efforts of the JIATFs and coordinate with the US Customs DAICC.

. Designate the Commander CDJTF as the US interdiction coordinator and let him assume the responsibilities outlined
in the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. If having a US interdiction coordinator is important, then we
should consider giving the job to an operational commander. Presently it is an additional duty of the Commandant of
the Coast Guard; this key job should be the sole responsibility of whomever it is given to.

. Use JTF-6 and elements of the joint staff's Counternarcotics Division to provide the building blocks for a CDJTF
operations center that could assume a comprehensive counterdrug support mission. Invite liaison officers from other
drug control program agencies (e.g., US Customs, Drug Enforcement Administration, Border Patrol, and so on) to join
the team.

. Expand participation in the national counterdrug effort. In coordination with the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, the State Department, and the federal drug law enforcement agencies, explore ways for new or increased
military support. Concepts worthy of evaluation include assisting the US Border Patrol in monitoring the US-Mexican
border by providing additional aerial platforms, ground surveillance, and engineer and communications support;
providing greater foreign drug intelligence support; and augmenting US Customs Service inspectors with more
National Guard personnel to assist at the various ports of entry nationwide. As potential areas for increased military
support are identified, we should seek the funding and force structure augmentation required. Even in this time of
constrained budgets, the chances are good that Congress would support a well-conceived interagency counterdrug
initiative.
As national security experts continue to evaluate the global environment, strategic assessments will likely include the
issues concerning transnational threats such as drug trafficking, terrorism, international organized crime, and failed or
failing nations. The drug threat will loom large in any such assessment. This is a good time to consider moving away
from a joint force mostly organized around regional domains (in the style of World War II theaters) in favor of small
functional joint commands that can rapidly deal with the interagency and transnational aspects of these threats. A
Counterdrug Joint Task Force seems an appropriate match to an imminent threat.
Reconsider Federal DLEA Organization
It may make little sense to reorder military resources under a CDJTF to improve support for drug law enforcement
agency missions unless the DLEAs can ensure focused and coherent counterdrug action. Certainly, it is neither
possible nor desirable to restructure state and local law enforcement organizations; besides, they are making progress
through participation in various multiagency counterdrug task forces formed at regional and local levels. However, the
federal law enforcement effort needs some retooling if military support and other national resources are to be used
effectively.
Just as the President would not permit the Army, Navy, and Air Force to go off to war without unified direction, he
should not allow the Border Patrol, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others involved in
counterdrug efforts to operate in close proximity without regard for a regional strategy and campaign plan. What is
needed at the regional level is unified action of the DLEAs under a single civilian leader.
Priority should be given to bringing order to our efforts along the southwest border where the greatest drug trafficking
now occurs. A "joint" law enforcement headquarters is needed there, one with the requisite command authority and
operating budget to integrate the efforts of the many federal agencies involved. Operation Alliance could be
transformed into a new interagency headquarters with an operational mission.

Federal DLEAs could be "sending agencies" that provide the specialized teams needed in the counterdrug effort. Each
agency guards its special roles and missions, but counterdrug efforts need to be integrated according to a coherent plan
under a single director. For regional efforts such as along the southwest border, it is time to move the operational
direction out of Washington and into the hands of a single civilian field director.
It is arguable that our overseas counterdrug effort needs a more unified focus too. But the coordination among
ambassadors' country teams and the regional commanders-in-chief has achieved a modicum of unity of effort, making
this requirement secondary to our need for greater unity of effort at home.
To Protect and Defend
Under normal circumstances, halting drug trafficking is a job that falls solely within the realm of civilian law
enforcement, but should we accept the current circumstances as normal? The profound damage wrought by drug
trafficking in Colombia and Mexico is evidence of the devastating nature of this threat. It is time to acknowledge the
magnitude of the problems being created by the drug trade at home, and it is time to bring them under control. The
authors recognize that demand reduction is the ultimate answer to solving the drug problem. However, unless a
concerted and well-publicized supply reduction campaign is conducted simultaneously, there is little hope of reducing
drug abuse and drug-related violence to a level tolerable to American society.
While the Department of Defense is just one voice in the government, it should express deep concern over the drug
threat to national security and indicate its willingness to become more involved in supporting the drug law enforcement
agencies. Now is the time for a more active and positive military role. It is simply the right thing to do.
Members of the military services are sworn to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and thereby the
nation, against all enemies, foreign and domestic. As the Quadrennial Defense Review proceeds, and strategic
documents are proffered in open forums, let us hope that these studies and documents accurately reflect the mortal
danger posed by the drug trafficker--he is at present our most formidable enemy.
NOTES
1. Regarding the phrase "kill people and break things," see Don M. Snider, "U.S. Civil-Military Relations and
Operations Other Than War (OOTW)," in Civil-Military Relations and the Not Quite Wars of the Present and Future,
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